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CITY GOVERNMENTS AND
PREDATORY LENDING
Jonathan L. Entin * and Shadya Y. Yazback †
Predatory lending has generated increasing attention in recent years.
The practice involves loans to homeowners who frequently cannot pay the
associated costs and therefore lose their homes. Predatory lending is
heavily concentrated in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods 1 and
disproportionately affects minorities 2 and the elderly. 3 The consequences
of predatory lending are devastating not only to the consumers who fall
prey to unscrupulous lenders’ tactics, but to the community as a whole. 4
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Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law and Political Science, Case
Western Reserve University.
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Senior Policy Analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The views expressed here are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
1. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE
LENDING
47
(2000),
available
at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD Report]; Paul S.
Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL
EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 401 (2004) [hereinafter Calem et al., Neighborhood Distribution];
Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate
Cities, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 603, 611 (2004) [hereinafter Calem et al., Neighborhood
Patterns]. Although predatory loans are disproportionately subprime, not all subprime loans
are predatory. See infra text accompanying note 8 and following note 15.
2. HUD Report, supra note 1, at 47; Calem et al., Neighborhood Distribution, supra
note 1, at 401; Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns, supra note 1, at 615.
3. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 14 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
4. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has explained:
Predatory lending is a national problem that is reallocating public and private
dollars away from low-and-moderate-income families and struggling inner-city
neighborhoods to a variety of private parties. Federal and local tax dollars have
been invested in such communities, adding to private donations, church
contributions, bank loans made under [the Community Reinvestment Act], and
work done by nonprofits and community volunteer organizations such as Habitat
for Humanity.
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Predatory Lending Strikes at the Heart of American
Neighborhoods, Community Reinvestment Forum 2 (Summer 2000), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/CommAffairs/CRForum/frmsp00/Smr00.pdf.
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For these reasons, many cities have tried to regulate or prohibit the
practice.
This Article assesses the legal challenges that cities can face in trying to
deal with predatory lending. 5 Part I provides an overview of the problem.
Part II focuses on the common law and statutory claims that cities might
bring, with particular emphasis on the evidentiary issues that cities can face
and the requirements of standing that could severely limit the effectiveness
of lawsuits brought by municipalities. The Article then turns to city efforts
to regulate predatory lending pursuant to their home rule authority, efforts
that can be stymied both by state laws that supersede municipal ordinances
and federal regulations that preempt state and local initiatives. Part III
focuses on home rule, explaining that most courts that have addressed the
question have held municipal initiatives to be preempted by state laws. Part
IV shows that the federal government might override much of what cities
and states try to do to attack the problem. The article concludes that,
despite the legal obstacles facing cities that want to regulate predatory
lending, local efforts have served as a catalyst for predatory lending
policies at the state level and might stimulate more effective national
policies as well.

5. We do not address the wisdom or effectiveness of predatory-lending laws, a subject
that has generated considerable discussion. On the wisdom of such laws, compare GAO
Report, supra note 3, at 76 (suggesting that market forces will eventually eliminate
predatory lending), with Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What
Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715 (2004) (arguing that
the market cannot impose sufficient discipline to drive out predatory lenders), and Patricia
A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005)
(using findings from behavioral economics to claim that borrowers do not act in accordance
with the assumptions underlying the position of advocates of the market approach). On the
effectiveness of North Carolina’s pioneering law in this field, compare Gregory Elliehausen
& Michael E. Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North
Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 411 (2004) (concluding
that the statute reduced the availability of credit to lower-income consumers), with Keith D.
Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage Lending? An
Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 435
(2004) (finding that the measure resulted in less aggressive marketing by non-bank lenders
and that minority and lower-income borrowers were less likely to get loans), and Roberto G.
Quercia et al., Assessing the Impact of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 15
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 573 (2004) (arguing that the law succeeded in reducing abusive
practices without restricting access to legitimate subprime loans). On the limited utility of
disclosure requirements as a remedy, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits
of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 754-806
(2006).
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I. A PRIMER ON PREDATORY LENDING
Predatory lending has yet to be defined in a comprehensive fashion. A
joint report issued in June 2000 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and
U.S. Department for Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) noted:
“Although home mortgage lending is regulated by state and federal
authorities, none of the statu[t]es and regulations governing mortgage
transactions provides a definition of predatory lending.” 6
Defining predatory lending is difficult for two reasons. First, loan
attributes may or may not be “predatory” depending on the sophistication
or financial position of the borrower. 7 Second, the definition of predatory
lending cannot be static because the lending market is always evolving in
light of technological, regulatory, and judicial advancements.
It is important to distinguish predatory lending from subprime lending.
Subprime lending—the extension of credit to consumers who would be
unable to obtain credit in the primary market—typically involves higher
interest rates and fees to account for the increased risk associated with a
particular consumer’s credit history. The higher rates are not predatory per
se. It is the circumstances surrounding the loan that typically make the
loan predatory. 8 For that reason, most government agencies and academic
experts define predatory lending in terms of specific elements, practices, or
effects. In 2001, then-Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich
proposed an approach to predatory lending that, defined the practice in
terms of elements:
[T]ypically predatory lending involves at least one, and perhaps all three,
of the following elements:
making unaffordable loans based on the assets of the borrower rather
than on the borrower’s ability to repay an obligation (“asset-based
lending”)
inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly in order to charge
high points and fees each time the loan is refinanced (“loan flipping”)
engaging in fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of the loan
obligation from an unsuspecting or unsophisticated borrower. 9

More expansive government definitions include a list of specific

6. HUD Report, supra note 1, at 1.
7. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 19.
8. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002).
9. Fed. Reserve Gov. Edward Gramlich, Remarks at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland,
Ohio
(Mar.
23,
2001),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010323/default.htm.
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practices. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly known as
the General Accounting Office) provides perhaps the most comprehensive
definition:
While there is no universally accepted definition, predatory lending is
associated with the following loan characteristics and lending practices:
Excessive fees. Abusive loans may include fees that greatly exceed
the amounts justified by the costs of the services provided and the
credit and interest rate risks involved. Lenders may add these fees to
the loan amounts rather than requiring payment up front, so the
borrowers may not know the exact amount of the fees they are
paying.
Excessive interest rates. Mortgage interest rates can legitimately
vary based on the characteristics of borrowers (such as
creditworthiness) and of the loans themselves. However, in some
cases, lenders may charge interest rates that far exceed what would be
justified by any risk-based pricing calculation, or lenders may “steer”
a borrower with an excellent credit record to a higher-rate loan
intended for borrowers with poor credit histories.
Single-premium credit insurance. Credit insurance is a loan product
that repays the lender should the borrower die or become disabled. In
the case of single-premium credit insurance, the full premium is paid
all at once—by being added to the amount financed in the loan—
rather than on a monthly basis. Because adding the full premium to
the amount of the loan unnecessarily raises the amount of interest
borrowers pay, single-premium credit insurance is generally
considered inherently abusive.
Lending without regard to ability to repay. Loans may be made
without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay the loan. In these
cases, the loan is approved based on the value of the asset (the home)
that is used as collateral. In particularly egregious cases, monthly
loan payments have equaled or exceeded the borrower’s total
monthly income. Such lending can quickly lead to foreclosure of the
property.
Loan flipping. Mortgage originators may refinance borrowers’ loans
repeatedly in a short period of time without any economic gain for
the borrower. With each successive refinancing, these originators
charge high fees that “strip” borrowers’ equity in their homes.
Fraud and deception. Predatory lenders may perpetrate outright
fraud through actions such as inflating property appraisals and
doctoring loan applications and settlement documents. Lenders may
also deceive borrowers by using “bait and switch” tactics that mislead
borrowers about the terms of their loan. Unscrupulous lenders may
fail to disclose items as required by law or in other ways may take
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advantage of borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication.
Prepayment penalties. Penalties for prepaying a loan are not
necessarily abusive, but predatory lenders may use them to trap
borrowers in high-cost loans.
Balloon payments. Loans with balloon payments are structured so
that monthly payments are lower but one large payment (the balloon
payment) is due when the loan matures. Predatory loans may contain
a balloon payment that the borrower is unlikely to be able to afford,
resulting in foreclosure or refinancing with additional high costs and
fees. Sometimes, lenders market a low monthly payment without
adequate disclosure of the balloon payment. 10

In the legal arena, Professors Engel and McCoy have produced a
definition of predatory lending that focuses on the composition of the loan
to determine whether it is predatory. While most of the Engel-McCoy
definition is encompassed in the GAO definition, Professors Engel and
McCoy also include waiver of meaningful legal redress—usually through
mandatory arbitration clauses that require borrowers to waive judicial
redress and class action participation—as an indicator of a predatory
loan. 11
From the above definitions, one can distill a definition of predatory
lending in its broadest conception: predatory lending occurs when a lender
extends to a consumer a loan with unfavorable terms that are structured to
strip the equity from the home, possibly resulting in foreclosure on the
home used to secure the loan and personal bankruptcy for the consumer.
The definitional complexity makes it difficult to quantify the aggregate
costs of predatory lending. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 12
(“HMDA”) requires that mortgage lenders with an office in a metropolitan
statistical area disclose data related to all the home mortgages they make
each year. 13 HMDA data cover approximately 80 percent of all home
loans nationwide. 14 The HMDA data show that 26.2 percent of covered
loans had annual percentage rates sufficient to trigger coverage by the
10. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 18-19.
11. Engel & McCoy, supra note 8, at 1260; see also Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy,
Predatory Lending and Community Development at Loggerheads 5 (Cleveland Marshall
Legal Studies Paper 05-105, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687161.
12. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2000).
13. A metropolitan statistical area is defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census based on
economic and commuting flows between contiguous counties based on decennial census
data. See Population Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Lists of Metropolitan and
Micropolitan
Statistical
Areas
and
Definitions
(2006),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metrodef.html.
14. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,
FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2006, at A123, A123.
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federal predatory lending laws, 15 but not all loans covered by the federal
predatory lending laws are necessarily predatory in nature. Even if
comprehensive data were available about every home loan, it would still be
impossible to identify the number of loans that are predatory, as no data set
could accurately measure the lender’s intent—a critical element of
predatory lending. Despite the problems of data availability, some
researchers have attempted to quantify the costs: an oft-cited 2001 report
estimated that predatory lending cost consumers roughly $9.1 billion
annually. 16
II. CITIES AS LITIGANTS: STANDING AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES
Because the direct victims of predatory lending are disproportionately
the elderly, minorities, and the less affluent, one might expect that cities
would seek to represent these victims by asserting claims on their behalf
against those engaging in these destructive practices. After all, the
Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of parens patriae suits
in which governments represent the interests of their constituents. The
earliest decision to this effect came in the 1900 case of Louisiana v.
Texas, 17 which rejected the claim on the merits but nevertheless observed
that “the State is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters
The Court’s most
complained of affect her citizens at large.” 18
comprehensive discussion of parens patriae standing appears in Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez. 19 According to Snapp, a
parens patriae action seeks to vindicate “quasi-sovereign” interests. 20
Those interests include a government’s concern for “the health and wellbeing—both physical and economic—of its residents in general.” 21 The
action must promote “an interest apart from the interests of particular
private parties” and involve “a sufficiently substantial segment of [the]
population.” 22
It is unclear whether cities could maintain parens patriae actions over
predatory lending. All of the Supreme Court cases discussed in the
15. Id. at A132.
16. ERIC STEIN, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE COST OF PREDATORY
LENDING 2 (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf.
17. 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
18. Id. at 19.
19. 458 U.S. 592 (1982). For a review of other parens patriae cases, see Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972).
20. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.
21. Id. at 607.
22. Id. The Court has also made clear that states may not pursue parens patriae cases
against the federal government. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).
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previous paragraph involved claims by states. 23 The Court has never
specifically considered whether cities or other political subdivisions may
pursue such claims, but its treatment of these subordinate units strongly
implies that they may not do so. For example, the “state action” exemption
from the antitrust laws 24 does not apply to municipalities, counties, or
similar subordinate units. Those units do not enjoy the attributes of
sovereignty that states possess. 25 Specifically, our system “has no place for
sovereign cities.” 26 This position reflects a more general view that cities
and other political subdivisions do not enjoy the protection of the Eleventh
Amendment because they are not sovereign. The Court so held in the 1890
case of Lincoln County v. Luning. 27 Although that decision has come
under widespread criticism, 28 it has been consistently reaffirmed, most
recently in the 2001 case of Board of Trustees v. Garrett. 29
Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, lower federal courts have
consistently held that municipalities and other political subdivisions may
not pursue parens patriae actions. 30 Those rulings rely on those units’ lack
23. The statute under which Snapp arose treated Puerto Rico as a state. Snapp, 458 U.S.
at 594 n.1, 608 n.15.
Nothing in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), affects the analysis here.
Whatever that case’s implications for the scope of parens patriae standing in general, the
dispute there had nothing to do with municipal standing. The only issue dividing the Court
was whether a state had standing to challenge the federal government’s refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. Compare id. at 1454-55 & n.17 with id. at 1465-66 & n.1
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
25. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1982); City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411-12 (1978) (plurality opinion).
26. Cmty. Commc’ns, 455 U.S. at 53.
27. 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (observing that “while the county is territorially a part of
the state, yet politically it is also a corporation created by, and with such powers as are given
to it by, the state”). Lincoln County, which held that political subdivisions did not enjoy
Eleventh Amendment protection, was decided on the same day as Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), which significantly expanded the protection that states enjoy under that
provision.
28. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577, 580 (1994) (summarizing the negative
scholarly reaction to the decision).
29. 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001); see also, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
30. Some lower courts have avoided the issue in situations where a ruling on the point
was not essential to the decision. See, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261,
268 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that the city had standing to sue on the basis of injury to
itself); La Crosse County v. Gershman, Brickner & Bratton, Inc., 982 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the county had standing to sue as a direct purchaser of services);
City of N.Y. v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 733 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984) (observing that there was no
dispute over the standing of other parties), aff’d sub nom. Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S.
467 (1986).
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of sovereignty, precisely the grounds that the Supreme Court has
emphasized in the Eleventh Amendment and antitrust contexts. 31
Accordingly, cities concerned about predatory lending almost certainly
could not pursue parens patriae cases in federal court. 32
State courts might be more hospitable to such claims, but the parens
patriae jurisprudence involving municipalities is sparse. 33 Most of the
states that have considered the question agree with the federal courts that
municipalities and other political subdivisions may not pursue parens
patriae actions because those units lack sovereignty. 34 Several other states
have focused more narrowly, concluding that political subdivisions may
not assert claims on behalf of their residents against other government
bodies while at least implicitly leaving open the possibility of parens
patriae actions in other circumstances. 35
We have found only one state where courts have clearly held that
municipalities may pursue parens patriae actions on behalf of their

31. City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004); Mount Evans Co.
v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994); Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of
Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. City of Pittsburg, 661 F.2d 783,
786-87 (9th Cir. 1981); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir.
1979); In re Multidist. Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.
1973).
32. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 365-66 (2006).
33. Several state courts, like their counterparts in the lower federal judiciary, have
avoided the issue of political-subdivision standing to pursue parens patriae claims. See,
e.g., Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ill. 1984) (noting that the issue had not
been raised in the lower courts and that private parties clearly had standing in their own
right); Town of Holbrook v. Town of Randolph, 373 N.E.2d 941, 943 (Mass. 1978)
(rejecting the claim on the merits without resolving parens patriae standing).
34. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 718 P.2d 235,
241 (Colo. 1986); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Kokomo City Plan Comm’n, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (Ind.
1975); Clark County v. City of Las Vegas, 574 P.2d 1013, 1014 n.1 (Nev. 1978); County of
Lexington v. City of Columbia, 400 S.E.2d 146, 147 (S.C. 1991).
35. See Douglas County Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 694 N.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Neb.
2005) (holding that a school district had failed to rebut the presumption that the state would
adequately represent its interests in a challenge to the system of funding public schools);
State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 530-32 (N.H. 2006) (concluding that municipalities
had not shown a compelling interest that would justify their independent lawsuits against
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors of the gasoline additive MBTE when the state was
already pursuing its own lawsuit); Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 711 A.2d 282, 289 (N.J. 1998) (finding that “a municipal agency’s parens
patriae interest in protecting the general public is insufficient to support standing to
challenge an exercise of power by another municipal agency”); County of Bergen v. Port of
N.Y. Auth., 160 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 1960) (finding that “each governmental entity is parens
patriae within the orbit of its own political responsibility” but that “the Port Authority rather
than the county . . . represents the residents of the Port District with respect to the public
function entrusted to it”).
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residents. That state is New York, where two cases have held that local
governments have authority to litigate parens patriae claims on behalf of
their residents. In City of New York v. Wyman, 36 the supreme court justice
(the trial judge in that state) held that the city had parens patriae standing
to challenge a state policy limiting public funding for abortions for indigent
women. The city was seeking to vindicate “a two-fold public interest”: a
financial interest in avoiding unnecessary medical and social costs and a
social interest in the health, safety, and welfare of city residents. 37 The
New York City charter explicitly authorized “actions in law or equity” in
“any court” on behalf of “the city or any part or portion thereof, or of the
people thereof,” so the municipal government had parens patriae
standing. 38 Although this decision was ultimately reversed on the merits,
neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the dissenter in the appellate
department (which affirmed the supreme court’s judgment) questioned the
city’s standing. 39 More recently, in Town of Riverhead v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 40 a local government was held to have parens patriae
standing to abate a public nuisance. 41 It is possible that other local
governments that enjoy strong home-rule authority could assert parens
patriae claims for predatory lending. 42 At this point, however, it seems
unlikely that very many cities could do so. 43
Even though cities probably lack parens patriae standing to go after
predatory lenders, they might well be able to sue on their own behalf to
seek relief for harm to the community itself. Several courts that either did
36. 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d per curiam on other grounds, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957
(App. Div. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972).
37. Id. at 712-13.
38. Id. at 712.
39. See City of N.Y. v. Wyman, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1971) (Steuer, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972).
40. 685 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. Div. 1999) (mem.).
41. The court cited only Snapp in support of its conclusion that the town could sue on
behalf of its residents. Id. at 793. But see Inc. Vill. of Northport v. Town of Huntington,
604 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 1993) (finding no parens patriae standing where a local
government simply aggregated “a collection of private suits” that did not assert quasisovereign interests but allowing village trustees to sue as individual residents of the
community).
42. For further discussion of home rule, see infra Part III.
43. An Illinois court has characterized “home rule units” (such as the City of Chicago)
as “quasi-sovereign entities.” In re County Collector, 774 N.E.2d 832, 847 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002). One commentator has characterized this language as supporting the notion that
Illinois cities may bring parens patriae claims. Engel, supra note 32, at 366. Perhaps so,
but that case did not address parens patriae. Rather, the dispute concerned the legality of
property taxes levied by the City of Chicago. The Illinois Supreme Court chose not to
decide whether “home rule units” or other political subdivisions may pursue parens patriae
actions. Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ill. 1984); see supra note 33.
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not reach the parens patriae issue or concluded that political subdivisions
had no such authority nonetheless have held that those governmental units
had standing in their own right. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, in City of
Sausalito v. O’Neill, 44 held that a municipality had standing to challenge
the adequacy of an environmental impact statement about plans to develop
a former military base. Although the city lacked sovereignty and thus
could not sue as parens patriae, 45 it did have standing to assert various
harms to its proprietary interests. Among those proprietary harms were
increased traffic congestion that would raise management and traffic safety
concerns, disrupt the community’s aesthetic appeal, reduce its tax revenues,
impair air quality, increase air pollution, and degrade local parks, trails, and
shore areas. 46 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit, in City of Olmsted Falls v.
FAA, 47 did not resolve the question of parens patriae standing in a
suburb’s challenge to the approval of a runway improvement project at
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because the suburb had asserted
harm to its own economic interests, which was sufficient to confer
standing. 48
State courts have reached similar conclusions. Two Colorado cases
illustrate the point. In Board of County Commissioners v. Denver Board of
Water Commissioners, 49 the state supreme court ruled that suburban
counties lacked parens patriae standing but could sue in their own right to
force the Denver water agency to continue supplying water on favorable
terms. 50 More recently, in Board of County Commissioners v. City of
Denver, 51 a state appellate court held that suburban governments could sue
as direct parties to a contract limiting noise levels at the Denver
International Airport even though the suburbs could not pursue parens

44. 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004).
45. Id. at 1197.
46. Id. at 1198-1200.
47. 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
48. Id. at 268. See also Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1451-53 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding that a county had standing, based on loss of revenue, to challenge the U.S.
Forest Service’s decision not to rebuild an income-generating structure that had been
destroyed by a fire); Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848-49
(9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the town had standing, based on diminished sales tax
revenue, to challenge the tribe’s regulation of liquor sales on land within the town); cf. City
of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that a city that
wanted to develop its own regional shopping center lacked antitrust standing to assert its
own proprietary interests in an effort to prevent a nearby community from developing a
similar shopping center).
49. 718 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1986).
50. Id. at 241.
51. 40 P.3d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
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patriae actions. 52
In short, cities interested in litigating predatory-lending claims will
probably have to assert their own interests. To do so in federal court they
will have to satisfy both constitutional and prudential requirements. The
constitutional minima are that a plaintiff allege a legally cognizable “injury
in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct and likely to be
“redressed by a favorable decision.” 53 On the prudential side, a plaintiff
must assert its own interests rather than those of third parties, may not sue
over generalized grievances, and must be within the zone of interests
protected by any statute on which it relies. 54 Similar standing rules apply
in many state courts, although some states have less stringent requirements
in this regard. 55
One possible claim that a city might assert would be based on the Fair
Housing Act. 56 As relevant to predatory lending, that statute prohibits
racial discrimination in residential real estate transactions, including the
Because predatory lending
financing of such transactions. 57
disproportionately affects persons of color, 58 it is possible that the practice
might violate the Fair Housing Act. This suggestion raises two questions:
(1) do cities have standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, and (2) may
a Fair Housing Act plaintiff prevail on a disparate-impact theory? The
answer to both questions is a qualified yes.

52. Id. at 32.
53. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 180-81 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
55. States are free to apply more permissive rules for standing in cases involving federal
questions. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). Some do so. See Engel,
supra note 32, at 360-61; Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1835-37 (2001). For a critique
of permissive state standing requirements, see Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating
Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 541-50 (2004).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
57. Section 805(a) of the Fair Housing Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any
person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of
such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). Section 805(b)(1) defines covered transactions to include “the making
or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance” for the purchase,
construction, improvement, repair, or maintenance of a dwelling as well as loans or other
financial assistance that are “secured by residential real estate.” Id. § 3605(b)(1).
58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Engel, supra note 32, at 356 & n.6.
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As to standing, the Supreme Court held in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood 59 that a municipality can sue for its own injuries that result
from Fair Housing Act violations. At issue in that case were claims that
real estate firms engaged in racial steering, showing African American
customers homes in a twelve-by-thirteen-block section of town while
showing white customers homes outside that area. 60 The village argued
that this practice unlawfully manipulated its housing market, undermining
the stability of an integrated neighborhood and encouraging white flight. 61
This in turn would reduce property values and the tax base needed to
support the provision of local services. 62 Although the Fair Housing Act
does not refer to municipalities or other governmental institutions as
potential plaintiffs, the Court held that the village could be an “aggrieved
person” for purposes of the statute. The Act defines an “aggrieved person”
as anyone “claim[ing] to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice.” 63 Congress may “expand standing to the full extent permitted
by” the Constitution 64 and had in fact done so in the Fair Housing Act. 65
Because the legislative branch had overridden prudential factors, standing
under this statute was not limited to direct victims of discrimination. All
that mattered was that the village had suffered “actual injury as a result of
the defendant’s conduct.” 66 The key question was “not who possesses the
legal rights protected by [the Fair Housing Act], but whether [Bellwood
was] genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone’s [statutory]
rights.” 67 In other words, the village had to satisfy only the constitutional
test for standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The
complaint alleged that the real estate firms had engaged in racial
discrimination that caused Bellwood to suffer a legally cognizable harm
that could be rectified by a favorable judicial ruling. That was sufficient
for standing. 68

59. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
60. Id. at 95.
61. Id. at 109-10.
62. Id. at 110-11.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2000).
64. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100.
65. Id. at 109 (holding that standing under the Fair Housing Act is “as broa[d] as is
permitted by Article III of the Constitution”) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Id. at 103 n.9.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 111, 115. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court cautioned that there might be
limits to the geographical scope of a neighborhood that could be encompassed by a Fair
Housing Act complaint. That point appears in the discussion of the standing of individual
plaintiffs. Id. at 114. It is not clear whether this observation applies to claims brought by
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As to disparate impact, the Supreme Court has never determined
whether discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a Fair Housing Act
claim. 69 The courts of appeals have generally held that proof of
discriminatory intent is not necessary, but they have taken somewhat
different approaches to disparate-impact claims. 70 At the same time, there
is general agreement that a showing of disparate impact does not suffice to
prove a statutory violation. 71
This discussion suggests that a city might have standing to assert a Fair
Housing Act claim against predatory lenders. The city would have to
allege that predatory lenders were engaging in racial discrimination in real
estate financing and that this discrimination harmed the city financially or
socially. These allegations would presumably satisfy the constitutional test
for standing. The city would not have to prove that the lenders
intentionally discriminated against borrowers on the basis of race, but to
prevail on the merits it would have to establish a disproportionate impact
on residents of color that was not sufficiently justified. The likelihood of
success in such an endeavor is unclear. Suffice it to say that we have not
found any reported case in which a city has advanced a Fair Housing Act
claim for predatory lending.
One leading commentator has suggested that, in light of the complexity
of standing doctrine, cities face potentially insurmountable obstacles to
pursuing some alternative claims against predatory lending. 72 Other such
claims could be difficult to prove on the merits. 73 For our purposes, what
matters is that cities face numerous uncertainties if they decide to litigate
directly against predatory lending. For this reason, many communities
have chosen instead to try to regulate the practice. As the next section
makes clear, that approach presents its own challenges.

cities or other political subdivisions.
69. Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 425
n.54 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-36 (2d Cir.), aff’d
per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir.
1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. See, e.g., Langlois, 207 F.3d at 49-50.
72. Engel, supra note 32, at 378-82 (discussing fraud and unfair or deceptive practices
claims).
73. Id. at 382-86 (discussing public nuisance and unjust enrichment).
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III. CITIES AS REGULATORS: THE MEANING AND LIMITS OF
HOME RULE
Traditionally, cities had very limited authority. Under the influential
Dillon’s Rule, municipalities could exercise only those powers that the
state explicitly granted or that flowed by clear and necessary implication
from explicit grants, with all doubts resolved against the existence of local
authority. 74 The restrictive approach embodied in Dillon’s Rule proved to
be quite controversial, because many people believe that local autonomy
promotes important social and political values. 75 The great majority of
states eventually conferred some variant of home rule on municipalities. 76
Even when cities have home rule, however, state law might preempt local
initiatives. This section focuses on state preemption of local ordinances,
with particular reference to cases that have resulted in reported judicial

74. See JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at
101-02 (2d ed. 1872) (“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable.”); see also JOHN F. DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at 448-49 (5th ed. 1911)
(“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply
convenient, but indispensable.” ) (internal citations omitted).
The Supreme Court similarly held that cities, as creatures of the state, generally
enjoyed no federal constitutional protections against the states. See Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (“The state, . . . at its pleasure, may modify or
withdraw [any governmental] powers [it has entrusted to municipal corporations] . . . with
or without the consent of the [city’s] citizens, or even against their protest.”).
75. Supporters note that home rule promotes democratic participation, facilitates the
adoption of public policies that take account of local needs and local opinion, promotes and
enhances a sense of community, and affords opportunities for reform and innovation. See
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 258-60
(2004).
76. Prominent scholars disagree over the extent to which home rule actually empowers
cities and whether municipal autonomy necessarily promotes the public interest. Compare
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) (contending
that the legal authority of cities remains unacceptably weak), with Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990)
(arguing that home rule prevents effective regional approaches to social problems and
aggravates many of them), and Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (criticizing unquestioning support for local
autonomy); see also David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255
(2003) (suggesting that home rule embodies a complex mixture of both grants and
limitations on local authority).
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decisions. 77
Since North Carolina enacted its pioneering predatory lending law in
1999, 78 almost twenty cities and other local governments have considered
similar proposals. 79 Almost all of the measures that passed faced
immediate legal challenges as well as efforts to obtain preemptive state
legislation. 80 Courts in three large states—New York, California, and
Ohio—have issued published decisions addressing the question of state
preemption of local predatory lending ordinances. The New York and
California courts ruled against the cities, but the situation in Ohio is more
complex: the state’s appellate courts have taken divergent approaches to
the issue, but a recent supreme court ruling has found two municipal
ordinances to be preempted by state law. These decisions suggest that, at
the very least, local laws and policies face a high likelihood of frustration if
opponents can influence state authorities to act.
The first of the state preemption cases, Mayor of New York v. Council of
New York, 81 invalidated an ordinance that forbade the city from doing
business with predatory lenders. 82 The court held that the state’s banking
77. More than two dozen states have enacted predatory lending laws. Local
governments had not acted in most of those states, so preemption was not always at issue.
For a summary of the provisions of the state laws, see Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory
Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 361-78 (2005).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1.1E, 24-10.2 (West 2004); see supra note 5 (citing
evaluations of this measure).
79. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory
Lending Laws, app. B, at 44 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2005049B, 2005), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2005/2005-049.pdf.
80. In Philadelphia, for example, opponents filed suit in state court. Even before the
court could rule on the ordinance’s validity, the state legislature enacted its own bill that
expressly preempted all municipal regulation of predatory lending. See Kimm Tynan, Note,
Pennsylvania Welcomes Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania’s Act 55 Preempts
Philadelphia’s Tough Ordinance But Provides Little Protection for Vulnerable Borrowers,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 872-84 (2003). Meanwhile, in Atlanta, a trial court enjoined the
enforcement of a local ordinance; the state legislature subsequently passed its own bill that
preempted municipal initiatives. See Azmy, supra note 77, at 362 n.348; Anne-Marie
Motto, Note, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying the
American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 896 n.298 (2002) (citing Milo Ippolito,
Finance Statutes Defeated in Courts, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 3, 2001, at 4H).
81. 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
82. The case arose in an odd posture: the city council passed the ordinance over the
mayor’s veto, after which the mayor sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was
invalid so that he would not have to enforce the measure. Id. at 269 & n.1. This was not the
only recent legal dispute between the mayor and the city council over the validity and
enforceability of a New York City ordinance. Another dispute involved the validity of a
measure (also enacted over a mayoral veto) forbidding the city from contracting with
businesses that fail to provide benefits to registered domestic partners of their employees
equal to those afforded to the spouses of their married workers. See Council of N.Y. v.
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 2006). The complexity of those issues is reflected
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law, which included specific provisions dealing with “high-cost” loans,
preempted the ordinance. 83 The opinion suggests two separate grounds for
preemption: field and conflict. As to the former, the state statute was “a
comprehensive regulatory scheme” that occupied the entire field. 84 Indeed,
the banking law specifically “provide[d] for ‘uniform regulation of the
residential mortgage lending process.’” 85 Accordingly, the absence of
language expressly preempting local predatory lending measures could not
save the ordinance; the detailed state law suggested that there was no room
for local legislation relating to predatory lending. 86 As to the latter, the city
ordinance contained provisions that were “in substantial conflict” with the
state law and would therefore “disrupt the operation” of that statute. 87
Just over a year later, a closely divided California Supreme Court, in
American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 88 ruled that state
law preempted another predatory lending ordinance. Both measures
directly regulated home loans. 89 Oakland’s ordinance was stricter than the
California statute. 90 Notwithstanding that difference, the majority relied on
field preemption and only indirectly addressed conflict preemption. The
state had implicitly occupied the field. Therefore, despite the absence of
language of express preemption, the state measure left no room for local
regulation. 91 The state, rather than local governments, traditionally had
regulated mortgage lending even before the adoption of the predatory
lending law. 92 Moreover, statewide regulation was essential. The housing
market was “critical” to the California economy, and statewide regulation
was “essential” because mortgage-backed securities were sold
nationwide. 93 Allowing municipalities to set their own standards would
in the close division in the New York Court of Appeals, which split 4-3 in that case. Id. at
447.
83. The state law was adopted shortly after the mayor vetoed the ordinance. Mayor of
New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 273-74 (quoting N.Y. BANKING LAW § 589 (McKinney 2006)).
86. Id. at 274.
87. Id. at 275. The court also held that the city ordinance was “substantially” preempted
by federal law. Id. at 276; see infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
88. 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005).
89. The state law was enacted eight days after the ordinance. Id. at 815.
90. For example, the Oakland ordinance applied to holders in due course, prohibited
most prepayment penalties, and required either that borrowers be provided with loan
counseling or that they explicitly waive such counseling. The state law did not apply to
holders in due course, permitted prepayment penalties, and required only that borrowers be
encouraged to seek loan counseling. See id. at 819.
91. Id. at 820.
92. Id. at 822.
93. Id. at 823.

2007]

CITY GOV’TS AND PREDATORY LENDING

117

undermine the “centralized and uniform” rules necessary for the economic
welfare of all California residents. 94
Everyone involved in the Oakland case, including the city and the
dissenting justices in this 4-3 decision, agreed that the state had a powerful
interest in predatory lending. 95 This consensus mattered, because the
California Constitution allows local governments to “make and enforce . . .
all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in
conflict with general laws” 96 and also permits home rule communities to
“make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal
affairs, . . . and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general
laws.” 97 If predatory lending was not a municipal affair but rather a
question of statewide concern, the case turned on whether the Oakland
ordinance conflicted with the state law.
Disagreement centered on the strength of the evidence that the
legislature had implicitly preempted local initiatives and on whether the
state’s regulatory interest was sufficiently powerful to trump the city’s
interest in dealing with the adverse social and economic consequences of
the practice within its own borders. The dissenters emphasized undisputed
evidence in the legislative history that mortgage lenders had strongly and
unsuccessfully lobbied for language expressly preempting measures such
as the Oakland ordinance. 98 In fact, that measure was specifically
discussed in a state senate committee hearing. 99 In the end, supporters of
the bill that the legislature ultimately enacted chose to say nothing at all
about preemption for fear that including such a provision would doom the
measure. 100 This evidence strongly suggested that the legislature had not
implicitly preempted the Oakland ordinance. 101 Moreover, the city had
persuasive grounds for adopting its own rules to supplement the state’s
approach to predatory lending. The practice was unusually common in
Oakland, disadvantaging both the borrowers who were victimized by
Under the
abusive practices and the community as a whole. 102

94. Id. at 825.
95. Id. at 820 (noting that the city “reasonably concedes regulation of predatory
practices in mortgage lending is one of statewide concern”); id. at 832 (George, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that “regulation of predatory lending undoubtedly is an area of
statewide concern”).
96. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
97. Id. § 5(a).
98. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d at 830-31 (George, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 830.
100. Id. at 831.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 832-33.
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circumstances, it was at least as plausible to conclude that the legislature
intended to establish minimum statewide standards that local governments
could supplement as to find an unarticulated intention to preempt the entire
field of predatory lending regulation. 103 The Oakland ordinance did not
“undermine” or “subvert” state regulations but simply afforded “additional
protections” to city residents who were “especially vulnerable” to the shady
practices of predatory lenders. 104
The majority rejected both lines of this analysis. First, this was a case of
implied preemption. 105 Determining whether the legislature implicitly
preempted local measures must be inferred not simply from the statutory
text but also from the nature, purpose, and scope of the state regulatory
scheme. 106 Any other approach would effectively eliminate the entire
doctrine of implied preemption. 107 Second, the structure and purpose of
the state law showed that it left no room for local regulation. Allowing
more stringent city ordinances would discourage legitimate subprime
lenders from making loans and either increase the cost or eliminate the
availability of such loans to lower-income borrowers. 108 The nature of the
problem suggested a need for “centralized and uniform” rules, which in
turn undercut the argument that the state statute set minimum standards that
cities could augment. 109
We need not determine which side had the better of the arguments. For
present purposes, it suffices that in California, as in New York, courts have
held that state laws preempt city ordinances addressing predatory lending.
The situation in Ohio has been somewhat settled until very recently. The
applicable home rule guarantee in that state provides: “Municipalities shall
have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt
and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” 110 Three large cities
in the Buckeye State have adopted predatory lending ordinances; different
districts of the Ohio Court of Appeals have reached divergent conclusions
about the validity of those ordinances; the Ohio Supreme Court recently
held that two of those ordinances were unconstitutional.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 820 (majority opinion).
Id. at 826-27.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 825.
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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The first Ohio decision came in City of Dayton v. State, 111 in which the
Ohio Court of Appeals for the Second District found a local ordinance to be
preempted by state law. As in Oakland and New York City, Dayton
adopted its predatory lending ordinance before the state legislature enacted
a statute dealing with the same subject. 112 Shortly after the state law
became effective, the city sought a declaratory judgment that the statute’s
preemption provision violated the home rule provision of the Ohio
The appellate court first concluded that Dayton’s
Constitution. 113
predatory lending ordinance did not deal with a matter of “local selfgovernment” within the meaning of the constitutional home rule guarantee,
but rather with “the use of police powers.” 114 Applying a two-part test, the
court went on to hold that the preemption provision of the state statute was
a general law and that the Dayton ordinance conflicted with it, so the local
measure had to give way. 115
First, the state preemption provision satisfied the applicable four-part
test for general laws. 116 That measure was part of a comprehensive bill
that addressed many aspects of predatory lending. Gaps and possible
imperfections in that bill did not render it less than comprehensive. 117
Moreover, the statute applied throughout the state, dealt with the police
power, and established a general rule of conduct. 118
Second, although the home rule provision allows cities to adopt stricter
regulations than the state, 119 Dayton’s ordinance conflicted in several
particulars with the state law. The only example the court cited was the
annual percentage rate (“APR”) for loans defined as predatory. The state
law defined as predatory those loans with an APR that exceeds the yield on
benchmark Treasury bills by more than ten percentage points, 120 while

111. 813 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
112. Id. at 710; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing New York City
and New York State); supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (discussing Oakland and
California). City ordinances in other states also seem to have stimulated state action. See
supra note 80 (discussing ordinances in Philadelphia and Atlanta that apparently led to the
passage of state laws in Pennsylvania and Georgia).
113. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 712. For the language of the home rule provision, see
supra text accompanying note 110.
114. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 714.
115. Id. at 722, 725. Before getting to the two-part test, the court extensively reviewed
and found it impossible to resolve the Ohio Supreme Court’s conflicting rulings about the
meaning of “statewide concern” and preemption. Id. at 714-21, 721-22.
116. See City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 964-65 (syl.), 968 (Ohio 2002).
117. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 723.
118. Id. at 724.
119. Id. at 725-26.
120. Id. at 711, 725.

120

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIV

Dayton’s ordinance apparently set a lower threshold. 121 This disparity
represented an impermissible implied conflict. 122 Moreover, a provision in
the ordinance that forbade the city from contracting with predatory
lenders—a measure analogous to the New York City ordinance that was
struck down a few months earlier 123 —was an illegitimate effort by the city
to do indirectly what state law prohibited it from doing directly, to regulate
predatory lending. 124
Six months later, in American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of
Cleveland, 125 the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District reached the
opposite conclusion and upheld a different predatory lending ordinance as a
legitimate exercise of home rule. At issue here, as in City of Dayton, was
the validity of the preemption provision in the state law. Although the
analytical framework was the same in both cases, the Eighth District in City
of Cleveland fundamentally disagreed with the Second District in City of
Dayton. Both courts did find that predatory lending ordinance was in every
important respect a police power regulation, not an exercise of local selfgovernment. 126 In all other respects, however, the City of Cleveland court
came out the other way than did its City of Dayton counterpart.
The Eighth District’s analysis in City of Cleveland began by observing
that the Ohio Constitution’s home rule guarantee prevents the legislature
from completely preempting municipal authority. 127 Focusing exclusively
on the preemption provision instead of the entire state statute, the court
held that this measure could not be a general law because it did not apply to
“citizens generally” but covered only local legislative bodies. 128 For this
reason, the preemption provision was unconstitutional. 129
Turning next to preemption, the City of Cleveland court found no
conflict between the city ordinance and the state law. The state law set
minimum standards that the city was free to strengthen. The city had not
explicitly allowed anything specifically prohibited by state law, nor did the
state law expressly allow anything specifically prohibited by the city
ordinance. 130 Of course, there might be an implicit conflict between the
121. Id. at 725. Curiously, the opinion does not specify the threshold set by the
ordinance.
122. Id. at 726-27.
123. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
124. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 727.
125. 824 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).
126. Id. at 558.
127. Id. at 559.
128. Id. at 560.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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statute and the ordinance. 131 That possibility had no legal significance,
however, because the Eighth District saw no justification in Ohio law for
recognizing the doctrine of implied preemption. 132
About six months after this ruling (and just over a year after City of
Dayton was decided), the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Sixth District, in
American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Toledo, 133 upheld the main
provisions of yet another predatory lending ordinance using an analysis
similar to that in City of Cleveland. The opinion in City of Toledo,
however, contained a more detailed analysis of the issues. The Sixth
District, like the Second District in City of Dayton, 134 began by focusing on
the entire state predatory lending statute rather than on its preemption
provision, and concluded that the state measure was a general law. 135
Nevertheless, relying heavily on the Eighth District’s analysis in City of
Cleveland, the City of Toledo court held that the statute’s preemption
provision violated the Ohio Constitution’s home rule guarantee. 136
Although the preemption provision did not invalidate the entire Toledo
ordinance, two relatively minor provisions of the ordinance did conflict
with the state law. 137 Both of those provisions were severable, 138 so the
balance of the ordinance remained a valid exercise of municipal
authority. 139
This brief summary makes clear that Ohio courts have disagreed not
only about whether cities have home rule authority to regulate predatory
lending but also about how to analyze that question. The Second District in
City of Dayton held that cities do not have such authority, while the Eighth
District in City of Cleveland and the Sixth District in City of Toledo held
131. The Cleveland ordinance had lower thresholds for interest rates, points, and fees as
well as somewhat different disclosure requirements than did the state law. The ordinance
also dealt with several issues that the state law did not address at all. See id. at 557.
132. Id. at 560.
133. 830 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006).
134. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
135. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d at 1243-44.
136. Id. at 1244. In support of its conclusion on this issue, the City of Toledo court
quoted two pages of the City of Cleveland opinion. See id. at 1244-45 (quoting Am. Fin.
Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 824 N.E.2d 553, 560-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), appeal
allowed, 825 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2005)).
137. One conflict concerned the penalties for payments under a home-improvement
contract, the other with the cancellation period for credit insurance. Id. at 1246-47.
138. Id. at 1248.
139. The court also found that the private right of action created by the ordinance violated
the separation of powers doctrine by intruding on judicial authority and that two other
provisions were void for vagueness, but all of these relatively minor provisions also were
severable. Id. at 1249-51. It bears emphasis that the problems with these provisions had
nothing to do with the city’s home rule powers.

122

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIV

that they do. At the same time, the Sixth and Eighth Districts disagreed
about whether to focus exclusively on the state law’s preemption provision
or on the statute as a whole. The Sixth District in City of Toledo agreed
with the Second District in City of Dayton that what mattered was the entire
statute, but they disagreed about whether that statute displaced municipal
regulation of predatory lending.
As this Article was going to press, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth District and held that the Cleveland ordinance was unconstitutional.
In American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 140 the court
concluded that the state’s legislation regulating predatory lending was a
general law 141 and that the more stringent provisions of the Cleveland
ordinance conflicted with the state measure. 142 A concurring justice
reasoned that the state had validly expressed its intention to occupy the
field and that the ordinance was therefore preempted regardless of any
conflict with state law. 143 Two dissenting justices would have upheld the
Cleveland ordinance. One found no conflict with state law; 144 the other
thought that regulation of mortgage lending was not a matter of statewide
concern and hence that municipalities remained free to adopt more
stringent rules about predatory lending than the legislature had enacted. 145
A month later, relying on this ruling, the court struck down the Toledo
ordinance as well. 146
The divergent approaches in the Ohio courts should not obscure the
lesson of this section: it is far from clear that cities have home rule
authority to regulate predatory lending at all, at least if the state has enacted
its own legislation in this field. Even if the Ohio Supreme Court upholds
the power of Buckeye State cities, the New York and California decisions
involving the New York City and Oakland ordinances stand as a warning
that in two of our largest and most influential states, municipalities have no
power to regulate predatory lending no matter how much harm that practice
may do to local residents and the local social fabric. This does not
necessarily mean that cities should sit idly by in the face of abuses. After

140. 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).
141. Id. at 784.
142. Id. at 785-86.
143. Id. at 790 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment only).
144. Id. at 791 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 795, 797-98 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). A thorough evaluation of these issues is
beyond the scope of this Article. One of the authors is working on a separate paper that
does seek to analyze the proper scope of home rule authority to regulate predatory lending
in Ohio. See Shadya Y. Yazback, Home Lending and Home Rule in Ohio: Municipal
Regulation of Predatory Lending (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
146. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Toledo, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006) (mem.).
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all, some states might permit cities to adopt their own ordinances. Even in
states that do not allow local action, city initiatives might well stimulate
state legislation. This was the pattern in all three of these states and in
others as well. 147 Nevertheless, the several decisions discussed in this
section serve as a warning about the limits of municipal action against
predatory lending.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Even if some cities have authority under state law to regulate predatory
lending, they might face yet another insurmountable obstacle: federal
preemption. Many lending institutions that make home loans are regulated
by the federal government. The National Bank Act authorizes the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency to regulate nationally chartered banks, 148
and the Home Owners Loan Act authorizes the Office of Thrift Supervision
to regulate federal savings associations. 149
In Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 150 a case discussed
earlier in connection with home rule, 151 the court held that New York
City’s ordinance prohibiting the city from doing business with predatory
lenders was preempted by federal law to the extent that the ordinance
applied to federally chartered banks and federal savings associations. With
respect to nationally chartered banks, regulations issued by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency preempted several provisions of the
ordinance, 152 and the Exportation Doctrine of the National Bank Act
preempted local restrictions on interest rates. 153 Even without a clear
conflict between the ordinance and Comptroller of the Currency
regulations, allowing the city to apply its requirements to national banks
would create an obstacle to the fulfillment of federal policies. That
sufficed to find these provisions of the ordinance preempted to the extent

147. See supra notes 80, 83, 98-100; supra text accompanying note 112.
148. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 371 (2000).
149. Id. §§ 1462a-1464.
150. 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
151. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
152. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
153. Id. The Exportation Doctrine is based on 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (allowing a national
bank to charge interest “at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District
where the bank is located”). See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996);
Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
For a comprehensive discussion of the Exportation Doctrine, see Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The
Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory
Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 539-600 (2004).
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that it applied to national banks. 154 Moreover, to the extent that
enforcement of some parts of the ordinance entailed giving the city access
to the records of national banks and allowing it to regulate activities
permitted by federal law, those parts purported to confer on the city
impermissible visitorial power over such banks without proper
authorization. 155 With respect to federal savings associations, Office of
Thrift Supervision regulations expressly preempted many provisions of the
New York ordinance. 156 In any event, federal regulation was sufficiently
pervasive as to occupy the field, leaving no room for local initiatives
applicable to such institutions. 157
The possibility of federal preemption goes well beyond local initiatives,
however. Both the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Office of Thrift Supervision have taken the position that federal law
preempts state as well as municipal predatory lending initiatives. 158 No
court has yet addressed that position with regard to state predatory lending
laws. At the same time, a federal district court in Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency v. Spitzer 159 recently held that federal regulations prevent
state authorities from enforcing fair housing laws against national banks. 160
Assuming that federal law and regulations do preempt state and local
predatory lending initiatives, 161 cities that have home rule authority to act

154. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
155. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000) (“No national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such
as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by
any committee of Congress or of either House duly authorized.”). The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated a regulation that defines visitorial authority as
“exclusive,” and to include “conducting examinations, inspecting or requiring the
production of books or records of national banks.” 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000(a)(3), 7.4000(a)(1)
(2007).
156. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 271 & n.7.
157. Id. at 272. Finally, the court found that section 501 of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000), expressly preempted
interest rates, points, and fees for first mortgages on one- to four-family residences. Mayor
of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73.
158. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1339-40
(2006).
159. 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
160. See also Clearing House Ass’n v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(reaching the same conclusion in a case brought by commercial banks).
161. Resolving whether federal law should preempt such initiatives is beyond the scope
of this Article. Most commentators have criticized broad federal preemption as either
unauthorized by current law or unwise as a matter of policy. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley,
Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2274 (2004); Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to
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might still have some reason to adopt predatory lending ordinances. After
all, federal preemption applies only to federally regulated financial
institutions. Not all home loans are made by such institutions or by entities
that are related to them. Although precise data are hard to come by, a
noticeable fraction of these loans is made by so-called nondepository
institutions, i.e., entities other than commercial banks, savings institutions,
and credit unions. 162 Information compiled by the Federal Reserve System
shows that mortgage companies (which are nondepository institutions)
received more than 60 percent of all home loan applications in 2005 even
though such companies made up only about one-fifth of the total number of
lenders. 163 Some mortgage companies are affiliated with federally
regulated depository institutions, but approximately 15 percent were
independent and therefore not subject to federal regulation. 164 We should
treat these figures with caution, however, because the Federal Reserve
study covers only about 80 percent of the country’s home lending. 165
Although we are dealing with an estimate, there is no reason to doubt that
at least some predatory loans are not subject to federal regulation. That
leaves room for state and local measures applicable to lenders that are not
encompassed by expansive federal preemption.
The justification for cities with home rule power to adopt predatory
lending ordinances might be stronger in some communities than in others.
Subprime lending—which is not necessarily, but often is, predatory 166 —
has grown significantly in recent years, and that growth has not been
uniform. 167 In some places, as many as half of all home loans are made by
entities that are not subject to federal oversight. 168 Cities facing that
situation might find it important to fill this regulatory void, even if local
ordinances might be able to address only part of the predatory lending

National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
981 (2006); Forrester, supra note 158, at 1359-70; Diana McMonagle, Note, In Pursuit of
Safety and Soundness: An Analysis of the OCC’s Anti-Predatory Lending Standard, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1533 (2004).
162. Avery et al., supra note 14, at A129.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at A123.
166. See supra text accompanying note 8.
167. See Susan M. Wachter et al., Subprime Lending: Neighborhood Patterns Over Time
in US Cities (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 06-19,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=920847.
168. See, e.g., Becky Gaylord, City Let Banks Ignore Law, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 22, 2006, at A1 (citing a study finding that, in Cleveland, banks and other regulated
entities made about 70 percent of home loans in 2000 but only around 50 percent of such
loans in 2005).
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problem.
CONCLUSION
Communities that experience the abuses associated with predatory
lending have powerful reasons for seeking to combat the many harms
resulting from that phenomenon. Unfortunately, they have only limited
legal tools available for this purpose. Cities cannot sue as parens patriae in
federal court, and they might not be able to do so in many state courts.
They might have standing to seek relief for harm to the community, as
opposed to individual residents, but such lawsuits could founder on
difficult problems of proof. Directly regulating predatory lending poses
additional challenges. It is far from clear that cities have authority under
their home rule powers. Even if they do, state statutes might preempt
important aspects of municipal ordinances. Perhaps more daunting, the
prospect of federal preemption of even state laws to the extent that those
laws apply to federally regulated lenders further limits the possibilities for
effective local measures.
Nevertheless, there might be good reasons for cities to consider adopting
their own regulations. Most important, some cities might have the
authority to act. Even if that authority is limited or nonexistent, municipal
ordinances have stimulated state legislation. To be sure, state measures
have not been as strong as the local initiatives that prompted them. At the
same time, getting even a weak statute enacted provides an opportunity for
strengthening amendments in the future. Perhaps state measures can help
to persuade federal authorities either to cut back on the scope of
preemption or to take more vigorous action against predatory lenders
within the sphere of their authority. Additionally, federal preemption
applies only to national banks, federal savings associations, and their
affiliates. Although that covers a wide swath of residential lending, it still
allows for local action against other lenders that might have a significant
effect on a city’s social fabric. In the end, cities working alone cannot
solve the predatory lending problem. Some of them might, however, help
to serve as catalysts for whatever solutions might be devised.

